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LEGITIMACY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
BY CARY COGLIANESE*
ABSTRACT
Parallels between corporate governance and state governance
appear to be growing. This essay focuses on the suggestion that corporate
governance is becoming structured much more like public government in
certain ways. This shift may well be helpful for enhancing credibility and
confidence in capital markets, but it also raises important questions. Will
reforms enacted in the post-Enron era limit managers' discretion to
innovate, take risks, and respond quickly to changing economic
circumstances? How far should society go in imposing on corporations
the kinds of procedures found commonly in democratic governments?
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the institutional structures of public corporations
appear to be converging in notable ways with the institutional structures of
public government. Changes to corporate governance may well be crucial
for enhancing trust in corporations and capital markets, but they may also
come at some cost to other important values. Because corporate
governance is a major issue for society and the economy, we ought to take
note of the direction corporate governance reforms are heading, if for no
other reason than to assess the consequences of such efforts to increase
corporate legitimacy.
POWER AND LEGITIMACY
I shall begin with a key linkage between power and legitimacy. For
most of us, the concept of legitimacy is deeply and persistently linked with
the power of government—not of business. A government, like that in the
United States or other developed countries, possesses enormous
powers—powers of violence, powers of compulsion, and powers of
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conscription. And government possesses its powers in a unified,
monopolistic manner. Of course, generally this is a good thing, for no
matter what many of us may think about competition in the marketplace,
free competition in the kind of police powers possessed by government
would not be a happy state of affairs. Indeed, creating a monopoly in such
powers is precisely the solution to the core problem of a Hobbesian world.1
Yet the monopoly of legislative and police power in the government
brings with it the potential for its own abuse—and also gives rise to the
challenge of legitimacy. Legitimacy is what is needed to justify, in moral
terms, the wielding of such enormous, monopolistic power. Of course,
compared with the Hobbesian world, any old monopolist might be thought
to be better than the brutish state of nature; however, life under an
oppressive governmental monopolist can also be quite nasty, brutish, and
short. Moreover, because the government wields power monopolistically,
people do not have any realistic choice about whether they must submit to
it. So, it is proper to demand more of a government than simply that it
amounts to being the biggest thug around. We can and should ask whether
government possesses legitimacy in addition to whether it has secured de
facto monopolistic power.
All of this should be rather familiar. But what about corporations
and their managers? They too exert significant power affecting people's
lives in important ways.2 Their power over employees is easiest to see.
But business decisions also have major ramifications for investors, for
customers, for those who inhabit the communities where corporations do
business, and for the economy overall in cities and regions around the
world. Even though corporations are unlike government in that they are
voluntary associations, and also unlike government in that they have
competitors, we still can and should ask whether corporate power is
legitimate. Just as with governmental power, corporate power—more
precisely, corporate managerial power—can be abused.3 It can be used to
satiate the self-interested thirst of greedy CEOs at the expense of
shareholders. It can be used to exploit workers, treating them inhumanely
and failing to provide safe working conditions or suitable wages. It can be
used to make profits at the expense of environmental quality, even putting
innocent lives at risk from accidents or toxic pollution.

1

See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950).
See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 3 (1985) (noting that
corporations are large employers and have important economic, social, and educational effects).
3
Cf. Frederick Schauer, Can Rights be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 225 (1981) (discussing how
people can abuse their rights).
2
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The existence of power wielded by corporations means that the
question of legitimacy can be applied to the private sector. And in our
post-Enron,4 post-WorldCom,5 post-Tyco,6 post-Parmalat7 environment, it
is precisely this kind of question that has been raised increasingly in board
rooms, stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
media, and in the academy. How can integrity and trust—that is,
legitimacy—be maintained in the corporate world?
My thesis—and it is simply a positive or descriptive thesis—is that
the prevailing responses to the question of corporate legitimacy have
followed certain of the forms of political or governmental legitimacy.
Perhaps more than ever before, corporate governance reforms bear a much
closer resemblance to institutional mechanisms typically found in
government.
With government, legitimacy is usually conceptualized in two main
ways: procedural legitimacy and substantive legitimacy. Procedural
legitimacy is defined in terms of democratic accountability, with elections
being the principal defining characteristic, and also in terms of institutional
arrangements like separation of powers, transparency, and rule of law
principles intended to combat abuses of power.
Substantive legitimacy, in contrast, is usually defined in terms of
rights, typically rights enshrined within a constitution that makes certain
actions off limits even to an otherwise procedurally legitimate legislature.8
When the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall make no law
abridging freedom of religion,9 for example, it is saying that even laws that
might meet all the tests of procedural legitimacy will still be illegitimate if
they restrict citizens' ability to worship freely.
There is a clear parallel with corporate institutions. What is called
corporate governance is akin to procedural legitimacy. Corporate
governance refers to, among other things, the assignment of separate
powers to management, shareholders, and boards of directors, the

4
For a summary of the Enron scandal, see The Fall of Enron, http://www.chron.com/
news/specials/enron (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
5
For a summary of the WorldCom scandal, see In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F.
Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
6
For a summary of the Tyco scandal, see http://www.tycofraudinfocenter.com (last visited
Jan. 30, 2007).
7
For a summary of the Parmalat scandal, see Gail Edmondson & Laura Cohn, How
Parmalat Went Sour, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2004, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content/04_02/b3865053_mz054.htm.
8
For a discussion of rights as side-constraints, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 26-53 (1974).
9
U.S. CONST. amend I.
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procedures for selecting and removing members of boards of directors, and
so forth.
What is the substantive legitimacy parallel? It is corporate
regulation. Regulation imposed by government says that even properly
constituted corporations with fully functioning boards of directors (a test
of procedural legitimacy) cannot take actions that will pollute the
environment, treat their workers badly, or take money from investors.
Regulation places side constraints on corporate managers in a way
conceptually parallel to the side constraints that constitutions place on
legislatures.
A SHIFT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
For the past thirty years or so, government regulation has placed
many stringent and costly side constraints on how corporations can act.10
These side constraints are much more extensive and detailed than the side
constraints the Constitution places on legislatures. But if the substantive
constraints on corporations have been strong, until recently at least the
requirements for procedural legitimacy imposed on corporations have
generally been much weaker than those found in government. It is here that
I think the potentially most profound changes are taking place.
Some of the most important changes in recent years in response to
Enron, WorldCom and other corporate scandals have been decidedly
procedural in nature. Corporate governance reforms imposed on companies
by the Sarbanes-Oxley law of 2002,11 and various rules issued either by the
stock exchanges or regulators such as the SEC, have together moved
companies closer in the direction of government in terms of at least some
of their institutional structures.12 Corporate management has become more
procedurally constrained, using institutional features not too dissimilar to
those procedural devices imposed on government. Consider the following
four institutional features: separation of powers, transparency, codes of
ethics, and elections.
Separation of Powers. Since at least the time of the Federalist
Papers, a key structural feature of government has been the separation of

10
See Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
1111, 1127-28 (2002); 2006 OMB DRAFT 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/inforeg/
reports/2006_draft_cost_benefit_report.pdf.
11
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 29 U.S.C).
12
For a review of recent changes in corporate governance post-Sarbanes-Oxley, see Joel
Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1159 (2005).
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powers, with ambition designed to counteract ambition, and a system of
checks and balances between different branches of government.13 In
principle, corporations have also long had their own checks and balances,
with boards of directors responsible both for hiring the CEOs who actually
run companies and then overseeing their work, and with shareholders
retaining the theoretical ability to challenge the slate of directors. While
boards in theory provide a check on managerial power, they have
functioned for many years quite deferentially to the CEO. Indeed, a
common cause of corporate scandals and skyrocketing executive
compensation has been said to be weaknesses in boards' oversight.14
Remarkably, unlike the kind of strict separation of powers observed in
government, boards of directors have never been entirely independent of
corporate management. Indeed, corporate managers (in particular, CEOs)
have sat and voted themselves on boards; in some cases the CEO has also
served as the chair of the board or on the nominating committee that selects
new board members. Furthermore, even so-called independent board
members, that is, those not employed by the company, would still
sometimes conduct extensive business with the company.
Such conflicts of interest no doubt can cloud board members'
judgment and reduce their incentives to look carefully at how management
is running a company with the interests of the shareholders in mind. The
thrust of recent changes to the rules of corporate governance has been to
make boards more independent than they have been, strengthening them by
moving them a bit closer to the kind of strict separation of powers exhibited
in national and state government.15 For example, Sarbanes-Oxley imposed
a requirement that the audit committees of the boards of public companies
be comprised solely of independent board members, that is, those that
neither manage the company nor accept consulting fees or other

13

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
For example, the Corporate Monitor's report in the WorldCom bankruptcy proceeding
characterized the company's governance failings squarely in terms of a lack of checks and
balances. Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust 1-2 (2003), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/corpgov82603rpt.pdf (arguing that "the board of
directors of the Company consistently ceded power" such that the CEO "was allowed nearly
imperial reign over the affairs of the Company" and "there were no checks and balances"); see
also LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23-44, 201-16 (2004) (noting how weaknesses in corporate
governance have kept executives from negotiating their compensation packages in an arm's-length
manner, leading to excessive compensation).
15
See CARY COGLIANESE & MICHAEL L. MICHAEL, AFTER THE SCANDALS: CHANGING
RELATIONSHIPS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5-6 (KSG Working Paper No. RWP06-024, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=911653.
14
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compensation from the company.16 New listing standards adopted by the
stock exchanges seek to strengthen the independence of boards of publicly
traded companies.17 And in the mutual fund industry, the SEC has made
dramatic changes to boards of directors, requiring that they have
independent chairs (something that previously only about 20% of the
companies in the industry had)18 and that 75% of the members of the board
be independent.19
Transparency. A key feature of procedural legitimacy for government has been openness. Laws need to be made in the open, and information about most government functions must be made available to the public
under laws such as the Freedom of Information Act.20 In the business
context, publicly traded companies have been, ever since the stock market
crash in the early part of the last century, subject to a variety of disclosure
requirements that similarly aim to create transparency.21 But SarbanesOxley has taken a series of steps designed to improve the accuracy of
financial disclosures and increase transparency in corporations. CEOs and
CFOs must now certify the accuracy of key financial statements,22 and
companies now have a duty to update their financials and report material
changes in the financial status of the company.23 New requirements that
restrict auditors from performing non-audit services, limit conflicts of
interest with auditing companies, and strengthen the regulation of the
auditing industry all aim to make investors better aware of the true financial
conditions of companies.24

16

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301(m)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2005); NYSE
Rs. 303A.02 & 303A.04, available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSE_Rules.
18
Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, SEC General Counsel, to Eugene Scalia, Esq.,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
ccusastay090904.htm.
19
Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270
(2006)). This rule was remanded for procedural reasons, but not vacated, in Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
20
Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552) (2006).
21
See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) (discussing the SEC's mandatory disclosure system and analyzing the
historical context which led to the system's creation).
22
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1350, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
23
Id. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (2006).
24
See generally id.
17
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Codes of Ethics. The federal government's code of ethics25 instructs
public officials and public managers to "Put loyalty to the highest moral
principles . . . above loyalty to persons, party, or Government
department,"26 to "Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of
the United States and of all governments therein and never be a party to
their evasion,"27 and to "Expose corruption wherever discovered."28 A
governmental code of ethics is premised on the belief that inculcating
norms of public-regarding behavior can help prevent governmental
corruption.
The Sarbanes-Oxley law similarly adopts measures to expand the
adoption of codes of ethics within companies.29 It also calls for the SEC to
impose new obligations on corporate lawyers, requiring them to report to
the corporate counsel or CEO any evidence of material violations of
securities laws or serious breaches of the company's managers' fiduciary
duties.30 Even in business, some protection against abuse may lie in efforts
to create a culture of integrity.31
Elections. Elections are a major feature of procedural legitimacy for
governments, and we are seeing some movement in the field of corporate
governance that may eventually make corporate management more
electorally accountable to shareholders. Formally speaking, shareholders
do vote on members of the board of directors, but they typically only vote
on one slate of candidates—those nominated by the existing board.32
Rarely are board elections real contests.33 Indeed, Professor Lucian
Bebchuk has documented that for major companies—those with a market
cap of over $200 million—meaningful electoral contests occurred in fewer
25
Code of Ethics for Government Service, 85 H.R. Con. Res. 175, 72 Stat. B12, 85th
Cong. (1958).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
30
Id. § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
31
See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT
A CROSSROAD 189-202 (2006) (arguing for a more trustworthy business environment through
cultural changes); Michael L. Michael, Business Ethics: The Law of Rules, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q.
475 (2006) (discussing the tensions between legal rules and an ethical business culture); Edward
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001)
(arguing that "legal governance and norm governance of corporations must work side by side").
32
See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary
Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 798, 801 n.60 (2002).
33
Susan A. Rose, Optional Cumulative Voting & Staggered Terms of Directors: Is the
California Climate Warming to Corporations?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 467, 483 n.133 (1990)
(noting that corporate boards remain fairly consistent because management's slate is "virtually
assured of reelection[]").
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than two companies a year on average during the period 1996-2002.34 This
really is not too surprising, since the board, after all, effectively controls the
ballot for itself.35
In response to this state of affairs, the SEC in recent years has
proposed a relatively modest change in securities rules that would make it
somewhat easier under certain conditions for candidates for a few board
seats to be placed on the ballot by shareholders themselves.36 The rule has
not been adopted, as it has engendered a firestorm of controversy given its
symbolic importance.37 It is not clear where a modest proposal like this
will eventually end up in the years ahead. But suffice it to say, the fact that
such a proposal has been seriously put forward by the SEC indicates yet
another possible direction that corporate governance may head in the
coming years, taking corporations a small step closer to the kind of
electoral legitimacy exhibited by governments.
CONCLUSION
In these four ways, and in others, we see what appears to be
movement in corporate America toward considering or adopting
institutional features that have typically been characteristic of governments.
This is not to say that corporate governance has become or ever will
become fully identical to the kind of politics exhibited by democratic
governments; far from it.38 Corporations are still much more hierarchical
and unitary than government is, and corporate managers still possess a lot
of power. But the kinds of responses and proposals adopted in the last few
years clearly move corporations and their governance in a direction closer
to the kinds of institutional arrangements that we have seen exhibited by
liberal, democratic governments.
Recognizing as a descriptive matter that such a movement may be
afoot is but the first step in posing the question of whether such a shift

34

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 856 (2005).
35
See Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 801 n.60.
36
See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 23,
2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, & 274).
37
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Feels Pressure to Weaken Some Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2004, at C1.
38
For a discussion of some of the limitations of applying the principles from governmental
democracy to corporate governance, see DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 201-04 (2005);
USHA RODRIQUES, THE SEDUCTIVE COMPARISON OF SHAREHOLDER AND CIVIC DEMOCRACY (U.
Ga. Sch. L. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-001, 2006), 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951712.
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would be a good one. In conclusion, I simply raise—though do not
answer—the most important policy or normative question that lies ahead
in corporate governance: how much procedural legitimacy should society
demand of corporations? The procedural mechanisms that characterize
governments often reflect a high level of risk aversion to the worst abuses
governments can exhibit. They are conservative in that they make it harder
for government to move with a unitary voice in a direction dictated by a
single individual or a single faction. One result is that government is often
criticized for its sluggishness and for its "gridlock."39
Maybe sluggishness and gridlock are not necessarily such bad things
for governments. How much gridlock and division, though, is tolerable in
the corporate setting? Answering this question will depend in part on an
assessment of the dangers of corporate power; the greater they loom, the
more ambition should be designed to counteract ambition in the corporate
world. But we must also consider the benefits that come from giving
business managers the discretion they need to innovate and respond quickly
to changing economic circumstances, and consider what will be lost if we
make corporate governance too constraining. I suspect that few proponents
of current corporate governance reforms would advocate making
corporations fully as rule-bound and democratically open as government is.
But exactly how far should we move in that direction? That is the key
policy question that must be confronted. It is squarely on the table if, as I
have suggested here, corporate governance is increasingly assuming more
of the institutional indicia of the governance of nations and states.

39
See, e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 10 (1995) (discussing the causes and consequences of governmental "gridlock").

